TECHNIQUES FOR MULTI-PLAYER GAMES | PROTOCOL FOR MULTI-PLAYER GAMES | OPORD

by

Major General (USV) Dan Peterjohn
1st Division (Red River), XV Corps
Army of the Tennessee

General:

I am presenting this article to share my recent experience participating in a PBEM Civil War battle involving multiple players. Fighting a multi-player battle offers players unique problems and challenges that serve to enhance the gaming experience. I will also offer my thoughts to our "Ancient Enemies" in the Confederate Army through my longtime opponent and friend, General Tony Hill, CSA.

Civil War gaming provides satisfaction to players on a number of levels. Friendly competition provides a great deal of enjoyment, as does the opportunity to make new friends from all over the world. Additionally, war games provide insights into what actual Civil War commanders contended with while risking their soldiers' lives and their nation's existence. The American Civil War Club offers a glimpse into this world at the reduced risk of losing a few points and suffering a bruised ego.

Multi-player games add another dimension to war gaming. The presence of more than one personality commanding on the field introduces a requirement for 'Unity of Command.' Furthermore, interaction between the players produces 'Friction.' Friction, as described by Clausewitz, develops as a cumulative effect of events that are often beyond a commander's control. Failure to coordinate unit boundaries, issuing unclear orders or the unexpected collapse of a key unit present common examples of battlefield friction. Friction can cause the most brilliant plan to fail miserably.

One of the most significant sources of friction is eliminated when only one player commands all the forces on a single side. By definition, there is 'Unity of Command' since a single will and purpose guides every unit. A single player experiences friction only through committing blunders such as miscounting hexes or blocking an advancing Corps with a supply wagon. In multi-player games, player interaction automatically inserts friction into the battle. Poorly conveyed orders, deliberate deviation by subordinate commanders from the overall commander's intent or lack of cooperation cause any number of unpredictable results. Personality differences create another dynamic on the battlefield. A subordinate who chafes at the thought of being told what to do or a micromanaging commander who insists on directing every minor movement of his subordinate commands can do as much to induce a defeat on an army as anything the enemy might accomplish.

Multi-player games add a human element to the battle. Tension between commanders, competing interests for resources added to the unpredictable actions of the enemy introduce a fresh element of excitement and challenge to the electronic fight. Lt. Col. Michael MacNamara, our V/XII Corps Commander, points out a further source of friction in multi-player games. Subordinate commanders often become focussed on their own Corps. As a result, gaps can easily open between subordinate formations and vital fire support for a neighboring unit's attack might be withheld through an inability to see "The Big Picture". All commanders must operate in a unified manner. The overall commander must provide that unity.

Organization:

I intend to address the following aspects of multiplayer gaming:

1) Developing the multi-player structure.
2) The protocol, or how to go about conducting and submitting turns to your opponent.
3) Organization for combat.
4) Transmitting orders.
5) Role of the Commander.
6) A discussion of a recent multi-player experience.

Prior to releasing this article to General Walter, I will ask my subordinate commanders and my regular opponent, General Tony Hill (CSA), to review my thoughts for accuracy and to add any comments they feel appropriate. General Hill is certainly welcome to share any of these observations/opinions with our Rebel brethren. Despite this input, I am solely responsible for the content of this article.

Developing the Multi-Player Structure:

The first step in setting up a multi-player game is rounding up the players. In our case, one of the Brigade Commanders in my division asked if we could set up a multi-player game. The idea intrigued me so I asked General Tony Hill if he was interested in joining in. Once he agreed, we proceeded to build our armies. In my case, I found willing volunteers within my own division and we ended up with five players for the Union side. We Yanks started with one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, one Major and a Captain. General Hill assembled a similar number of officers consisting of a rather intimidating array of Generals, at least one Field Marshal and a Star Fleet Commander!

The second step involved figuring out just how we were going to go about playing this multi-player game. I took the liberty of drafting a "protocol" and submitted it to my fellow Union players and General Hill for comment. We went through two revisions until we all agreed on a common protocol. I will discuss the nuts and bolts of the "protocol" later. I think it's important that everyone must have a chance to comment and agree on the multi-player methodology up front.

Next we had to select an overall commander for the Union army. After some discussion one of my brigade commanders suggested that I take command, if for no other reason than I had written and revised the protocol. The other players agreed and I accepted the position.

We then had to agree on a scenario. This step was a bit more involved as it required input from all the players on both sides. Many good suggestions came in including playing one of the 'Blind' scenarios. We eventually settled on Gettysburg scenario 05a, 'Double Envelopment.' We chose this one because: 1) All the players had Gettysburg. 2) The scenario was long enough (16 turns) to provide a good test of the protocol. 3) The scenario's relative brevity would to allow us to move onto play a Blind scenario in a relatively short time (or so we thought!).

The fifth step involved organizing our forces for combat. I made a serious error at this point that I will discuss later. For now, I will say that the overall commander must determine how he will fight the battle BEFORE he assigns Corps/Divisions to his fellow players.

After organizing the army and assigning commands, we moved onto the final step, that of determining how we (in our case, the Union) were going to fight the battle and developing the order describing the general course of the battle.

Once both sides had completed their setup, the two army commanders, General Hill and myself, agreed that it was time for the drummers to beat 'The Long Roll' and for the buglers to sound 'Boots and Saddles' to at last signal the start of the fight!

Multi-Player Protocol:

Perhaps the most important thing to consider when developing a protocol for conducting the turns is to make sure that all the players have a say in process. I have attached the final document we all agreed to as an example of one way to conduct an orderly sequence for the turns.

Here are some observations on the protocol:

· I'm not sure that it is important that both sides strictly follow the same protocol. As players drop out and rejoin the fight, the overall commander must make decisions to streamline the process to keep the game moving. Therefore, some deviations can be expected.
· Initially, the members of the Union Army agreed to let the Army Commander execute the entire melee phase for all Corps in order to save time between turns. However, when the fight was actually joined, each Corps Commander indicated his desire to conduct his own melees. Although this added to the time required for the Union Army to process its turns, I believe it also enhanced the players' experience.
· Despite the best efforts and wishes of all concerned, processing turns required a considerable length of time. Anyone joining a multi-player game must be patient and committed!
· The Army Commander must closely monitor the processing of each turn. Both armies in our game had players drop out for holidays, computer problems, health problems and some who simply quit for no stated reason. Unless the commander monitors the progress of his side's turn and issues periodic queries/reminders to his players, the game can easily 'die on the vine'.
· Early in the game, Lt. Col Dan MacNamara suggested that upon receiving the turn file from the Rebs, I should send the file to all the Union players so they could see what had transpired. This provided a means to discuss courses of action at the start of each turn. This is an excellent addition to the protocol.
· Lt. Col. Dan MacNamara also suggested that before sending the turn back to the Rebs, I should send it to all the Union players in order for all to see the results of individual offensive firings and melees. I'm not so sure that this is as important as sharing the initial file with all concerned, but it is a point to consider.
· A lot of thought must go into the order of play. Lt. Col. Michael MacNamara has pointed out that one Corps could easily block the movement of another during multi-player games. The commander may change the order of moving from turn to turn if he chooses. However, maintaining a rigid order provides more realism to the play [even though doing so can tempt a commander to move another commander's assets out of his way].

Organization for Combat:

The Army Commander has to organize his forces and allocate troops to his various commanders. In the case of the Union Army, I had five players (including myself) to run seven Corps and the Army Reserve Artillery. One of our players requested to command only one Corps due to the limited time he had to devote to the game. I decided to allocate two Corps to three of our players and the final Corps to the last player. I chose to remain in overall command with no troops assigned to my control. Had the Union Army cavalry available in this scenario, I probably would have kept them under me. I "kept a string" on the Army Reserve Artillery. By that, I mean I allocated different regiments of artillery to the control of various Corps Commanders with the understanding that I could switch artillery assets to a different Corps as the situation required. There are many ways to organize forces for the fight. The most important lesson I learned is to make sure everyone has a challenging assignment.

Having said that, it's time to point out my first serious mistake as the Army Commander. I made my corps assignments before I figured out how I wanted to fight the battle. I assigned I Corps and XI Corps to one of our players. When I issued the order for the conduct of the battle, these two Corps had the mission to defend Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. Consequently, both of these Corps remained static throughout the battle leaving their commander little to do. He eventually dropped out of the game. I never learned if he dropped because of computer problems or from boredom. I expect the latter cause was the reason for his withdrawal. I should have made certain that everyone had at least one Corps that had an active role in the battle.

Transmitting Orders:

Transmitting orders to subordinate commanders is one of the biggest challenges inherent in multi-player games. The commander must present an overall plan for the conduct of the battle and adjust that plan as events unfold. He must transmit his intent clearly. At the same time, the commander must avoid micromanaging the activities of his fellow/subordinate players. I'll let my fellow commanders comment on how successful I was in accomplishing the last objective.

Initial Order:

I used the U.S. Army's 5-paragraph Field Order format to present the plan for the battle. Unfortunately, not everyone was familiar enough with this format to pick up on the nuances. Some of our players did not understand that they had extra artillery allocated to them from the Artillery Reserve. I caught this by watching the movements of each Corps and asking the Corps Commanders if they knew about their additional batteries. The commander must closely monitor his fellow players' moves to determine if they understand his intent.

I have attached a copy of the initial order for our multi-player battle as an example of one way to transmit a battle plan to all participants.

Subsequent Orders:

I found it useful to present my assessment of the Rebel movements and my estimate of enemy intentions to my commanders at the start of each turn. After I gave my assessment, I issued orders for that turn assigning tasks to the Corps where necessary. These orders were subject to modification based on comments and suggestions from my fellow players. Exchanging ideas at the beginning of each turn proved to be instructive for all concerned.

Role of the Commander:

I believe the overall commander has two responsibilities in a multi-player game. First, he has to keep the game going by keeping tabs on who has completed his phase and finding out who has possession of the file when the play stalls. He should step in quickly to take over for a fellow player who is unable to complete his turn. The commander's second responsibility is to provide a coherent plan for his army and to coordinate the efforts of the various parts of that army. Since no one wants to act as another's robot, the overall commander should strive to give 'mission-type' orders to the Corps and allow the Corps Commanders to figure out how to accomplish their mission.

A typical order from the Army Commander to his Corps Commanders might sound like this:

"II Corps attacks to seize the High Value Point (HVP) objective at Hex (32,33) [J. Smith Farm] and to destroy the artillery located in that area. III Corps conducts a supporting attack, maintains contact with of II Corps to protect the left flank of II Corps. V Corps defends to retain Little Round Top, the Wheatfield and Devil's Den while maintaining contact with the III Corps left flank. I Corps and XI Corps continue to make breastworks to defend Cemetery and Culp's Hills. XII Corps advances to make contact with Ewell's Corps forward of Wolf's Hill but does not become decisively engaged (i.e. keep Ewell busy). VI Corps moves to hide positions east of Codori Farm in the vicinity of hex 36,42 and prepares to either reinforce II Corps' attack or to counter attack against any threat to II Corps' right flank. The 4th Regular Artillery Regiment is detached from the control of V Corps and attached to the control of the II Corps."

A Discussion of our Multi-Player Battle:

Opening Moves:

As outlined in our operations order, III Corps withdrew from its exposed position in the Peach Orchard and formed up along Cemetery Ridge. The deployment of the rest of the army seemed to progress smoothly until the second or third turn when it appeared that III Corps and V Corps were switching places in the Army of the Potomac's line of battle. My original intent was to have III Corps defend the Little Round Top/Devil's Den area and to use the offensive power of II and V Corps against the Confederate center. In the end, V Corps ended up on the AOP's left flank and III Corps was between V Corps and II Corps. This may have started with a misunderstanding of the base order or as a result of a deal between the two commanders. Our V Corps Commander suggests that this switch occurred as events unfolded during III Corps' withdrawal from the Peach Orchard. III Corps was routing and as the III and V Corps Commanders talked about the situation the switch from the original plan occurred with no damage to the integrity of the Union line. In any event, the switch had progressed to the point where any attempt to "fix" it would have caused chaos on the Union left. I decided to let the situation stand and to fight the battle from there.

This episode provides an excellent example of how "Friction" can occur through differing perceptions of the course of the battle and differing interpretations of missions. This is exactly the sort of thing that happens on the real battlefield. To paraphrase Von Moltke the Elder, "No plan ever survived the first shock of battle!"

Developing the Situation:

Early in the game, we had little serious contact apart from some probing attacks. In our chosen scenario, the Union Army had no cavalry available for reconnaissance or security missions. Consequently, I was very concerned about our inability to monitor the Army's wide-open flanks. I spent a good deal of effort trying to get a small regiment into position to watch for an enveloping movement by the Rebs. I was particularly concerned about the left flank south of Big Round Top. For one reason or another (Related mainly to Friction) we did not get a unit in position to observe that flank until about Turn 10. This unit arrived too late to observe a sizable Confederate cavalry force slipping around that flank. That force went into hiding in the forest behind the main Union line. This was to prove fatal to the Union cause in the end. This episode demonstrates the "Friction" inherent in multiple-player games.

Actions by Subordinate Commanders:

II, III and V Corps repelled a minor thrust on the Union left early in the game. The Union Army consolidated its positions and waited for a Confederate general attack in accordance with the plan to receive the attack into a prepared position. We planned to counter punch with at least two Corps led by the fresh VI Corps once the Confederate Force became disrupted and fatigued.

As the game progressed, it became apparent that the Confederate Commander had no intention of storming our prepared positions. He appeared content to build up his force and await our own attack. The AOP II Corps Commander pointed out that since the Rebs had enough points for a minor victory, it was incumbent on us to take the initiative. He also pointed to a juicy target of lightly defended artillery in the vicinity of hex 32,33 [J. Smith Farm] and declared he would attack to grab the Reb artillery. Since he was already moving, I decided to reinforce his attack to ensure success. I ordered III Corps to conduct a supporting attack on II Corps' left. I also ordered V Corps to advance west from LRT and the Wheatfield area to protect III Corps' left and to forestall an attack by Hood's Division formed on the extreme Confederate right. VI Corps formed up in hide positions near The Angle/Ziegler's Grove. VI Corps' mission was to prepare to counter and destroy an anticipated attack by Pickett's Division into the II Corps right. I, XI and XII Corps were to hold their positions along the Cemetery-Culp's-Wolf Hill line.

Confederate Strategy:

General Hill was kind enough to provide his comments to this article. He confirmed that he chose to pursue a defensive course of action similar to that of the Army of the Potomac. He decided to accept risk with an early infiltration of his cavalry into the Union rear, initially for the purpose of capturing Union artillery arriving late in the game. The cavalry arrived one turn too late to grab up those guns so General Hill changed the cavalry's mission to seizing High Victory Point Objectives or capturing Union artillery posted behind the Union line.

The Confederate left (Ewell) engaged in the same type of holding action that the Army of the Potomac's XII Corps executed north of Wolf's Hill. General Hill retained one large cavalry regiment for the purpose of demonstrating on the Union right to give the impression that the entire Confederate Cavalry force was operating forward of Union lines. His ruse successfully produced the intended result and we in the Army of the Potomac were lulled into a false sense of security.

General Hill also shared that he chose to do all the firing and melees for his Army by himself. This allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to return their turns much more quickly than the Army of the Potomac.

General Hill stated that, in his opinion, three players to a side seem to be the optimal number for a multi-player game. Three players allow for rapid replacement of commanders who drop out and allows for a rapid turn around for turns.

End Game:

The combined attack by II and III Corps succeeded in capturing a number of Rebel guns and the High Victory Point hex at hex 32,33. V Corps was able to hold off counterattacks by Hood's troops and soon the Army of the Potomac had enough points for a major victory with darkness rapidly approaching. We were breaking out the champagne and party hats when disaster struck. Just as darkness fell, the full weight of the Confederate Cavalry emerged from the forests and overran LRT. This coup was magnified by my order for V Corps to remove its artillery from the front lines and to consolidate them where they could defend our own High Value Point areas. Consequently, we lost a sizable number of artillery pieces and the Rebs gained enough points for a major victory just as darkness fell.

A series of desperate night attacks failed to rectify the situation and the Army of Northern Virginia won a Major Victory.

Conclusion:

Multi-player gaming, though somewhat tedious and labor-intensive, introduces a novel dimension to Email war gaming. The uncertainty factor is increased and many of the personal relationship problems that commanders in all wars have had to face are reproduced onto the electronic battlefield.

I expect the experience is more challenging for the overall commander than for his subordinates. Lt. Col. Greg Olender comments that he found the experience interesting as well and that as a subordinate commander, he found that he was able to complete his movements, firing and melees in less than ten minutes. This indicates to me that playing as a subordinate commander provides a challenging experience for a small investment of time and effort.

***

ASSUMPTIONS:

1) Each side will have two or more players acting as subordinate commanders controlling a portion of the forces available to their side.
2) One player on each side will act as the overall commander for his side issuing orders/guidance for the subordinate commanders to execute.
3) One, or both, of the overall commanders may or may not choose to personally control a portion of his force (i.e. the Reserve, Artillery, a Corps or the Cavalry).
4) Each Commander will be able to move and fire offensively with each of the units under his command in accordance with the overall commander's guidance.
5) Whoever initiates the game selects the Automatic Defensive Fire option.
6) Each Army Commander is responsible to develop his own reports procedures within his Army to keep all commanders informed about events occurring outside their commands.
7) In order to keep things going, each Army Commander will perform or designate a subordinate Commander to perform the moves of any Army member who cannot submit a move in a timely manner (e.g. a Corps Commander called away from his computer for a business trip).
8) Players engaging in a multiplayer game should agree to make submitting moves for that game a priority effort. This is designed to avoid a loss of interest on the part of all concerned due to the game bogging down.
9) The Army Commander is responsible for selecting and informing his subordinates of the Army's password.

For the purpose of this protocol, I am assuming that both sides have agreed to a scenario in which the Confederate side initiates the action. I'm assuming in this example that each side has one overall (Army) commander and two subordinates who control one or more Corps. I am also assuming that each Army Commander has chosen to personally control hi Army's Cavalry.

PRIOR TO THE GAME START:

Both Army Commanders issue their guidance and general game plan to their subordinate commanders.

CONFEDERATE TURN:
1) The Confederate Army Commander moves his units (if any), exits the game while saving the "current" file and emails the file to his 1st Corps Commander.

NOTE: On subsequent turns, the Confederate Army Commander emails the file he receives from the Union Commander to all of his subordinates so they can observe the Union Army's moves. After viewing the Union moves, the subordinate commanders should delete that file and wait for the actual game file before proceeding. This assumes the Army Commander is personally moving some units. If not, the 1st Corps Commander can continue the turn sequence.
2) The Confederate 1st Corps Commander moves his units, exits the game while saving the "current" file and emails the file to the 2d Corps Commander.
3) The 2d Corps Commander moves all his units, ADVANCES the game to the next phase (Union Defensive Fire Phase), and observes the effects and pattern of that defensive fire. He then advances to the Offensive Fire phase and causes the units under his command to fire. He then exits the game, saves the current file and emails the file to the 1st Corps Commander. The 2d Corps Commander also sends an Email to the Army Commander telling him which of 2d Corps units he wants to melee against specific enemy units.

(NOTE: this (Last) Corps Commander should also send a report about what he observes during the Union Defensive fire phase to the players on his side.)

4) The 1st Corps Commander executes his Offensive Fire Phase, exits the game while saving the 'current' file and emails the file to the Army Commander. At this point, the 1st Corps Commander should send an Email telling him which 1st Corps units he wants to melee against specific enemy units
5) The Army Commander conducts his Offensive Fire Phase, ADVANCES the game to the Confederate Melee Phase, conducts his melees (if any) and then conducts the melees requested by his subordinate commanders.
6) The Army Commander advances the game to the next phase (Union Movement Phase) and emails it to the Union Commander. He also informs his subordinates of the melee results.

UNION TURN:

1) The Union Commander emails the file to his subordinate commanders so that they can observe the Confederate Replay. The subordinate commanders should delete this file after observing it.
2) The Union Command performs its turn following the same procedure described above.

***

OPORD

Headquarters, 1st Division, XV Corps
Army of the Tennessee
Ziegler's Grove, Adams County, Penn.
July 2, 1863

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces: The Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) after entering battle with the Army of the Potomac (AOP) on July 1st remains a potent force capable of offensive action. General Lee, suffering a bad case of Montezuma's revenge after imbibing too freely on Amish Apple Cider, has been temporarily replaced by Maj. Gen. A.W. Hill. Maj. Gen. Hill is known to be a very aggressive combat commander. This, combined with the fact that the ANV must either gain victory over the AOP or return to Virginia to shorten lines of supply and reinforcement, guarantees that the ANV will conduct all out assaults aimed at the destruction of the AOP.
1) I Corps (Longstreet): I Corps ANV is arrayed in line of battle in vicinity of Warfield Ridge with Hood's and McLaw's Divisions at close to full strength. Pickett's Division has yet to enter the field.
2) II Corps (Ewell): Rodes' and Early's Divisions have suffered losses during fighting on July 1 but remain effective. Johnson's Division is relatively fresh. Rodes' Division occupies Gettysburg and the area north to Seminary Ridge. Early's Division occupies positions just east of Gettysburg and Johnson's Division is massed near Benner's Hill.
3) III Corps (A.P. Hill) occupies the area between Longstreet's and Ewell's Corps along the general line of Seminary Ridge. Despite losses suffered on July 1st to Pender's Division, it remains capable of offensive action. Anderson's Division is at full strength. Heth's Division, having suffered considerable losses remains in reserve in the vicinity of Herr Ridge.
4) Cavalry Corps (Stuart): Some Regiments of Confederate Cavalry have been identified on the field. The bulk of Stuart's Corps remains absent from the field. Confederate Cavalry remains capable of raiding the rear areas of the AOP.
5) Probable Enemy Course of Action: Given the time constraints the ANV is working under, we can expect the Rebs to conduct a general assault on our line with the Main Effort designed to take the Key Terrain of LITTLE ROUND TOP (LRT) and CEMETERY HILL. Once either Objective is taken or the line on CEMETERY RIDGE is breached, I expect the enemy to shift his Main Effort to the destruction of Union Forces. In this case he will continue his attack to drive Union forces east of TANEYTOWN ROAD to limit the AOP's ability to mount an effective counterattack. An all out attack on CULP'S HILL is unlikely, however, we can expect elements of Ewell's Corps to either infiltrate or attack through the woods in the vicinity of WOLF HILL in order to outflank the AOP or to pin down XII Corps on our right flank.

b. Friendly Forces.
1) I Corps (Capt Gwil Morrison)
2) II Corps (Maj. Greg Olender)
3) III Corps (Ltc Dan MacNamara)
4) V Corps (Ltc Mike MacNamara)
5) VI Corps (Ltc Dan MacNamara)
6) XI Corps (Capt Gwil Morrison)
7) XII Corps (Ltc Mike MacNamara)
8) Artillery Reserve (Col Dan Peterjohn)

2. MISSION: AOP defends in sector on July 2, 1863 to defeat the ANV and render it incapable of further combat operations.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of the Operation: COMMANDER'S INTENT: I want the AOP to concentrate on the destruction of Confederate Regiments. We will retain Key Terrain Features primarily to draw the enemy into attacking carefully prepared defenses supported by artillery. The secondary purpose of retaining the Key Terrain features such as LRT, CULP'S HILL, CEMETERY HILL and CEMETERY RIDGE is to deny the enemy high-speed lateral routes such as the EMMITSBURG ROAD and to deny the Rebs high-payoff Victory Point Objectives. Retention of Key Terrain features is of secondary importance to killing Rebs. In no case can we allow the Rebs to push our forces back so far that we lose the freedom to move our own reserves laterally behind our line of battle. I designate the TANEYTOWN ROAD and BALTIMORE PIKE as NO PENETRATION LINES. VI Corps is the AOP Reserve and will be the defeat mechanism when the Rebel assault culminates. In other words, VI Corps (and possibly XII Corps if not heavily committed) will be used to attack into an enemy flank after the Corps in the main line of battle have stopped or destroyed enough of the enemy to cause him to pause or to go to the defense. The last resort for employment of VI Corps will be to bolster/reinforce the AOP line of battle.

b. Maneuver: III Corps occupies a dangerously exposed position forward of the main line of battle. III Corps withdraws to the Southeast to defend LRT and to secure the left flank of the AOP. V Corps moves rapidly forward to form line of battle to the right of III Corps. II Corps holds to the right of V Corps, fortifies its positions on Cemetery Ridge/Hill and occupies as much of XI Corps left flank positions as practicable to allow XI Corps to concentrate forces on Cemetery Hill. XI Corps defends to retain Cemetery Hill. I Corps supports the XI Corps defense by forming line of battle to the XI Corps right. XII Corps defends to retain Culp's Hill and screens the AOP right flank to detect any attempt to infiltrate or envelop the AOP in the vicinity of Wolf Hill. VI Corps (RESERVE) concentrates in the vicinity of 39,48 and prepares to attack along the line of THE ANGLE-CODORI FARM-32, 33 or along the line CULP'S HILL-53,47-GETTYSBURG. The reference points mentioned only describe the general line of an attack. Any attack by VI and/or XII Corps will be oriented on the destruction of Reb forces rather than gaining ground objectives.

c. Fires:

1) Corps Commanders will retain control of their organic artillery.

2) The Army Commander retains control of the Artillery Reserve. He will give or remove Operational Control (OPCON) of Artillery Reserve units as the situation dictates.

3) I encourage all commanders visit the War College Web site (http://home.arcor.de/dierk_walter/WC/index.htm) and read the articles on the effective use of Yankee Artillery by General Sutton and General Ross. Contact the Army Commander if you need the passwords to enter the Army War College site.

4) We have 398 artillery shots for this battle. Priority of fires is to large concentrations of Reb Infantry and Cavalry. Counter battery fire should be restricted to the Automatic Defensive Fire phase. Corps Commanders not being attacked should consider limbering selected batteries to conserve ammunition. Under no circumstance should we waste ammunition on firing at enemy leaders.

5) Batteries that suffer losses reducing them to one or two guns should be removed from the line of battle and moved to a secure area well to the rear.

6) Artillery Organization for Combat:

a) 1st Regular Brigade (at 46,43 and 34,40) OPCON to XI Corps.
b) 1st Volunteer Brigade (at 27,43 and 27,44 {4 Batteries}) OPCON to III Corps.
c) 2d Volunteer Brigade (at 26,48 {2 Batteries} OPCON to III Corps.
d) 3rd Volunteer Brigade (at 37,44 27,47 26,47 {2 Batteries}} OPCON to III Corps.
e) 4th Volunteer Brigade (at 25,49 {2 Batteries} 25,48 {2 Batteries} OPCON to XI Corps.
f) XII Corps position organic artillery where it can support the defense of Cemetery Hill by I Corps and XI Corps.

d. Tasks to Subordinate Units:

1) I Corps:
a) Advance to support the right flank of XI Corps.
b) Relieve XI Corps units at 49,47 and 50,46.
c) Defend to retain the line from 50,46 to CULP'S HILL.
2) II Corps:
a) Defend to retain CEMETERY RIDGE from THE ANGLE to CEMETERY HILL.
b) Tie in with V Corps (Right) and XI Corps (Left).
c) Retain one Brigade in Reserve to be committed with permission of the Army Commander.
d) Be prepared to attack to envelop enemy forces attacking either V Corps or XI Corps.
e) Take up as many positions on the XI Corps left as possible to allow maximum concentration of XI Corps forces.
3) III Corps:
a) Withdraw from positions along the EMMITSBURG ROAD to form Line of Battle along the DEVIL'S DEN-WHEAT FIELD-TROSTLE HOUSE line.
b) Defend to Retain Little Round Top (LRT).
c) Establish contact with V Corps vicinity TROSTLE HOUSE/WEIKERT'S WOODS.
d) Screen the Army Left Flank to detect attempts to envelop the AOP.
4) V Corps:
a) Advance rapidly to form Line of Battle from WEIKERT'S FARM to THE ANGLE.
b) Defend to retain that line.
c) Main Effort is to secure the III Corps Right Flank.
d) Coordinate left and right contact points with III Corps and II Corps.
5) VI Corps (Army Reserve):
a) Concentrate vicinity 39,48. Select positions not under enemy observation.
b) Be prepared to attack into the flank of enemy forces penetrating either V Corps or XI Corps (See 'Maneuver' above)
c) Be prepared to attack to restore the AOP Line of Battle.
d) Do not commit forces without permission of the Army Commander.
e) On Order, release organic artillery to OPCON by other Corps.
6) XI Corps: Defend to retain CEMETERY HILL.
7) XII Corps:
a) Defend to retain CULP'S HILL.
b) Establish security vicinity WOLF HILL to detect attempts to envelop the AOP Right Flank.
c) Be prepared to attack from CULP'S HILL toward GETTYSBURG to hit the flank of and destroy enemy forces attacking I Corps or XI Corps.

e. Coordinating Instructions:
1) Corps Commanders will directly coordinate left and right contact points with adjacent Corps. Direct conflicts to the Army Commander for resolution.
2) Road Priority:
a) The secondary road leading from the BALTIMORE PIKE at 31,55 to grid 26,55 is allocated to V Corps until all of its units pass west of the TANEYTOWN ROAD. All other units will ensure they are off the road at the end of their movement phase to keep that route clear.
b) VI Corps has priority of use on BALTIMORE PIKE until further notice.
3) Units already occupying defensive positions on Cemetery Ridge will not vacate their positions until another Federal force is in a position to relieve them.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT:
a. All Corps will retain control over their own Supply units unless otherwise instructed by the Army Commander.
b. Corps requiring additional supplies should direct requests to the Army Commander.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL:
a. Army Commander will locate in the vicinity of Ziegler's Grove initially.
b. Succession of Command: Col. Peterjohn, Ltc D. MacNamara, Ltc Mike MacNamara.

Official:

Cornpone
Operations Officer

PETERJOHN
Colonel, USV