Martin Dietrich Dietz

Email: mdietz@ucsd.edu
Phone: (858) 386 3295


Current address:Home address:
University of California, San DiegoUniversity of St.Gallen
Economics Department SH230IFF-HSG
9500 Gilman DriveVarnbüelstrasse 19
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508CH 9000 St. Gallen

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Research Papers

Dividends and Taxes (with Roger Gordon)
Work in Progress

Abstract: Follows ...


Agency Problems, Investment Policy, and Dividend Taxation (with Benita von Lindeiner)
March 2006

Abstract: Starting from the empirical evidence presented by Chetty and Saez (2005) on the 2003 dividend tax cut in the United States, we develop an intertemporal firm model based on Jensen's free cash-flow hypothesis (1986) to show how dividend taxation interacts with the agency structure. Contrary to the old and the new view of dividend taxation, we find that an increase in the dividend tax rate mitigates investors' incentives to interfere with inefficient management in the mature firm, thus worsening corporate governance, leading to a decrease in dividend payments and an increase in investments.


Capital Income Taxation, New Firm Creation, and the Size Distribution of Firms
November 2005

Abstract: This paper empirically explores the impact of corporate and personal taxes on the size distribution of business firms. Based on a stylized model of new firm creation and diversity of an economy, we hypothesize that much of the tax burden of corporate and dividend taxation falls on the creation of new firms and depresses entrepreneurship. Mature firms on the the other hand are unaffected by the dividend tax and increase in size by the reduced diversity of the economy. Using data on the size distribution of firms, we find strong empirical support for the impact of taxes on average firm size. Taxes significantly depress the number of small sized firms while bigger firms seem almost unaffected.

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Firm Level Innovation, Knowledge Capital, and a "New" Theory of Investment
October 2005

Abstract: Transfering the standard macroeconomic investment model to firm level data has produced very disappointing results. In looking for better models of choppy investment series, the literature has relied on random depreciation or infrequent readjustments towards the optimal capital stock. We show that such an approach fails to explain the full pattern of firm level behavior. As an altenative, we develop a firm level model of investment based on the individual technological shocks to single firms.

Work in Progress


A Growth Oriented Dual Income Tax (with Christian Keuschnigg)
June 2005
Resubmitted at International Tax and Public Finance

Abstract: We develop and quantitatively assess a fundamental capital income tax reform proposal that combines an allowance for corporate equity with a dual income tax of the Nordic type. The reform is financed with an increase in the value added tax. The paper demonstrates the neutrality properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and organizational choice. The reform decisively strengthens savings and domestic investment of home and foreign based multinationals. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland indicate that the reform could add between 2 to 3 percent of GDP in the long-run, depending on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it also imposes considerable costs in the short-run. To offset the intergenerationally redistributive effects, we compute a tax smoothing scenario.

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Dividend and Capital Gains Taxation in a Cross-Section of Firms
June 2005
Invited for resubmission at Oxford Economic Papers

Abstract: This paper analyses the general equilibrium effects of the new view on dividend taxation. It embeds the nucleus theory of firm development into a framework of monopolistic competition with new firm creation. Dividend and capital gains taxes affect the outcome in two dimensions: First, a differential treatment of dividends and capital gains distorts the allocation of capital across firms. Second, dividend as well as capital gains taxes are anticipated at the start-up stage of firms. The capitalisation is shown to depress firm creation and aggregate capital accumulation.

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Tax Law Asymmetries and R&D by New and Established Firms
May 2005

Work in Progress


Corporate Income Tax Reform in Switzerland (with Christian Keuschnigg)
Published: Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2004, 140(4), pp. 483-519.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the likely economic consequences of a specific proposal for corporate income tax reform in Switzerland that is based on the recent ERU (2001) report. The proposal includes a partial dividend tax relief, more effective taxation of capital gains, and a property tax reduction, all relating to qualified stakes in corporate firms. Based on an analytical and quantitative analysis, we find that the reform removes an important tax barrier against dividend payments, reduces the cost of equity capital, thereby reduces debt leverage and encourages investment in the corporate sector. In stimulating transitional growth towards higher long-run income levels, the reform expands tax bases and thereby becomes considerably less costly in the long-run. A sensitivity analysis shows that the quantitative results are rather robust.

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Screening and Advising by a Venture Capitalist with a Time Constraint
November 2003

Abstract: This paper proposes an intertemporal model of venture capital investment with screening and advising where the venture capitalist's time endowment is the scarce input factor. Screening improves the selection of firms receiving finance, advising allows firms to develop a marketable product, both have a variable intensity.

In our setup, optimal linear contracts solves the moral hazard problem. Screening however asks for an entrepreneur wage and does not allow for upfront payments which would cause severe adverse selection. Project characteristics have implications for screening and advising intensity and the distribution of profits. Finally, we develop a formal version of the "venture capital cycle" by extending the basic setup to a simple model of venture capital supply and demand.

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last update: 03/24/2005 [ Top of Page ]